University of Rochester - Graduate Epistemology Conference-Participants and Abstracts

Participants and Abstracts

"Warrant, Luck, and Truth"

EJ Coffman- University of Notre Dame

(Commentator: John Shoemaker - University of Rochester)

In this paper, I reflect on an important recent argument developed by Trenton Merricks (call it the 'Luck Argument') for the conclusion that Warrant entails Truth. After laying out Merricks's version of the Luck Argument, I highlight a respect in which that version needs to be clarified. A discussion of some varieties of Epistemic Luck and their bearing on Knowledge acquisition and possession ensues. In the light of that discussion, I present a better version of the Luck Argument. I then explicate the chief extant objection to the Luck Argument (call it the 'Chief Objection'). Finally, I argue for the falsity of one of the claims on which the Chief Objection depends.

"Contextualism and Isolation"

Anthony Coleman - Harvard University

(Commentator: Chris Tillman- University of Rochester)

Contextualism in epistemology is the thesis that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions are determined by features of the conversational context in which those ascriptions are made. Some philosophers find contextualism appealing because it purports to resolve skeptical paradoxes and explains how they arise. Because skeptical paradoxes can arise during the course of reflection, when no conversation is occurring, the contextualist account has to be generalized to explain how. DeRose (1995) provides a brief sketch for how that might be done.

In this paper, I argue that DeRose's sketch fails for two reasons. First, truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions in conversation are context sensitive because sentences of the form "S knows that p" can have variable propositional content. Because thoughts have their contents essentially, though, the truth conditions of a knowledge ascription made in reflective isolation cannot be context sensitive. Second, as Schiffer (1996) has pointed out, a contextualist semantics must be coupled with an error theory in order for contextualism to be plausible. I argue that the most natural form such an error theory would take in the conversational case is not applicable to the case of reflection.

"Curiously Strong Undercutters: Rethinking Projective Defeat"

Brent Kyle - University of Colorado, Boulder

(Commentator: Shawn Graves- University of Rochester)

Projective theories (famously known as the "arguments from suspicion") are
theories about the genesis of theistic belief that generally attribute the grounds of such belief to a psychological or sociological mechanism rather than to divine revelation. These can be defeaters for non-inferentially justified theistic belief. Defeaters are evidence that, when added to a person's noetic structure, render an initial belief unjustified or irrational for that person. An intuitively compelling reason for denying that projective defeat actually occurs is that these theories are unsubstantiated by the evidence in their favor-I call this the charge of slim evidence. Alvin Plantinga and William Alston each states this charge as a primary reason for rejecting projective defeat. I argue that their claim presupposes the following defeat principle: If the strength of evidence in favor of a defeater is less than the strength of evidence in favor of the target belief, then the defeater is not successful. Most significantly, I argue for (what I call) the differential judgment regarding a classic case of perceptual defeat. The differential judgment entails that the above principle is false for undercutting defeaters. Therefore, the charge of slim evidence is not able to fend off the undercutters from projective theories.

"Relevant and Irrelevant Alternatives"

Joshua Smith - Ohio State University

(Commentator: Greg Fowler - University of Rochester)

Relevant alternative analyses of empirical knowledge have faced
some derision in the literature, due in large part to the failure of those
who advocate such analyses to provide an account of relevance. Most
who hold such an account (such as Dretske, Cohen, and Lewis) oer at
best lists of things that can determine whether a given alternative is
relevant or not. I have here put their considerations to use, generating
an account of relevance. My hope is that this will alleviate some of
the concerns critics have about the Relevant Alternatives approach to
knowledge.

"Common Attitudes"

Eric Swanson - Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(Commentator: Rachel Sussman - University of Rochester)

Common attitudes relate a group of believers to a collection of propositions
in the following way: a group commonly vs that F iff the members
of the group all v that F, all v that all v thatF, all v that all v that all v thatF, and so on. Economists, game theorists, computer scientists, linguists,
and philosophers often appeal to common attitudes in their analyses of social
interactions and institutions. I argue that we have an embarrassingly
tenuous grip on just which common attitudes actually do the work that
common attitudes are supposed to do.

The common attitudes most often discussed are common knowledge,
common belief, and Stalnakerian common ground. I argue that these
states are all neither necessary nor sufficient to make possible the sorts of
social interactions they are supposed to ground. If this is right, then many
analyses that appeal to common attitudes should be supplemented with a
specification of which common attitude is actually at work, and a characterization
of the logic of that attitude. Moreover, if I am right then work on
common knowledge has no obvious application. To drive that point home
I’ll raise two problems for common knowledge, designed to show that it is
never in fact realized.

"Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen"

Ted Poston - University of Missouri, Columbia

(Commentator: Dan Mittag - University of Rochester)

This paper argues that Ernest Sosa's recent criticism of Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory fails. Sosa argues that Fumerton's account of non-inferential justification falls prey to the problem of the speckled hen. I argue that Sosa's criticisms are both illuminating and interesting but that Fumerton's theory can escape the problem of the speckled hen. More generally, the paper shows that an internalist account of non-inferential justification can survive the powerful objections of the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.

"De Se Knowledge and the Possibility of Omniscience"

Stephan Torre - University of Massachusetts, Amherst

(Commentator: Joshua Spencer - University of Rochester)

In this paper I examine an argument that has been made for the claim that de se knowledge is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient being. I claim that the success of the argument depends upon whether it is possible for someone else to know what I know in knowing (F), where (F) is a claim involving de se knowledge. I discuss one reply to this argument that appeals to first person propositions and argue that this response is unsuccessful. I then consider David Lewis's theory of de se attitudes involving the self-ascription of properties. I claim that, according to this theory, there are two senses in which someone else can know what I know in knowing (F). I then argue that the second sense allows for the compatibility of de se knowledge with the existence of an omniscient being.