Political Science 272: Theories of International Relations
Tuesday-Thursday, 12:30-1:45. Fall 2005
Gavett
208
Randall
Stone Office
Hours: Tuesday, 1:15-3:15
Associate
Professor of Political Science Harkness
Hall 336 273-4761
Course
web site: http://www.courses.rochester.edu/stone/PSC272
Purpose of the course: This course
surveys approaches to theory building in international relations, and
introduces students to elementary game theory.
Major topics include the causes of war, the conditions for international
cooperation, and the role of international institutions. This is an advanced course; some previous
course work in international relations or international history is
assumed. This course satisfies the Political Science requirement for Formal
Theory.
Course Requirements: It is
essential to complete the required reading. There will be a midterm exam on
October 20, a final exam, two problem sets to familiarize students with game
theory, due Friday, October 14, and Friday, November 18, and a short (4-page)
paper due Friday, December 9. Students
are expected to come to class prepared to discuss the indicated readings. Grading: 40% final exam, 20% midterm, 10% each problem
set, 10% paper, and 10% participation.
Completing all of the written work is required to successfully complete
the course.
Writing Credit Requirements for
Political Science: In addition to the regular
requirements, students registered for PSC
272W write a term paper (15-20 pages) that uses primary sources and/or data
to make a theoretical argument. A draft
is due at 5:00 pm on October 7, and the final paper is due on December 12 at
5:00 pm. Grading will be as follows: 25%
final, 25% term paper, 10% midterm, 10% each problem set, 10% short paper, and
10% participation.
Baldwin, David A., ed.
Neorealism and Neoliberalism:
The Contemporary Debate. (New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993).
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1992).
Russett, Bruce. Grasping
the Democratic Peace: Principles for a
Post-Cold War World.
(Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1993).
Schelling, Thomas. The
Strategy of Conflict.
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,
1960).
Waltz, Kenneth N.
Theory of International Politics.
(New York: McGraw Hill, Inc.,
1979).
Kreps, David M. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990).
All articles are available on
JSTOR, but for convenience, you Dec. wish to purchase Lynn-Jones, Sean and Steven
Miller, eds. The Cold War and
After. (Cambridge: MIT Press, Exp. ed., 1993).
Course Outline
Week One
Tuesday Sept.
6: Theories of International Relations
Thursday Sept.
8: Three Images and Two
Perspectives
Week Two
Tuesday
Sept. 13: Understanding Waltz
Thursday
Sept. 15: The Case for Structural Realism
Week Three
Tuesday
Sept. 20: Critiques of Structural Realism
Week Four
Tuesday
Sept. 27: Preferences, Utilities, Lotteries,
Expected Utility
Thursday Sept. 29: Strategic Form Games &
Nash Equilibrium
·
Week Five
Tuesday
Oct. 4: Extensive Form Games &
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Thursday
Oct. 6: Repeated Games
·
Week Six
Thursday
Oct. 13: Global Politics and
International Institutions
·
Download
Answers to Practice Problem Set 1
Download Answers to Practice Set 1b,
Part1;
Part2;
Download Problem Set 1
** First Problem
Set Due by 5:00 October 14 **
Week Seven
Tuesday
Oct. 18: Midterm Review and Discussion
of the First Problem Set
Thursday
Oct. 20: Midterm exam
Week Eight
BEGIN
DANGEROUS PARALLEL
Tuesday
Oct. 25: The Strategy of Conflict
·
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Chpts. 1-3;
Thursday
Oct. 27: Perceptions and Uncertainty
(Notes
continued from last lecture)
Download
Dangerous Parallel Briefing
Tuesday
Nov. 1: Deterrence and Crisis
Management
Thursday
Nov. 3: Nuclear Weapons
·
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Chpts. 8; 10.
·
Mueller, John.
“The
Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World.” International
Security, 13, No. 2. (Autumn, 1988): 55-79.
·
Jervis, Robert. “The
Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment.” International Security 13, No. 2.
(Autumn, 1988): 80-90.
Week Ten
Thursday Nov. 10: War and Reason, Chpt.
4.
· Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason, Chapters 1-4, appendix
1.
· Fearon, James D.
"Rationalist
Explanations for War." International
Organization 49, No. 3 (Summer
1995): 379-414.
Week
Eleven
Tuesday
Nov. 15: War and Reason, Chpt. 5
Thursday
Nov. 17: War and Reason, Chpt. 6
· BdM and
Lalman, War and Reason, Chpts.
5-6.
**Second Problem Set Due November 18 by 5:00**
Download Practice Problems and Solution
Set 2: Part
1 Part
2
Week
Twelve
Tuesday
Nov. 22: Assessment of War and Reason
Thursday
Nov. 24: Thanksgiving
Week
Thirteen
Tuesday
Nov. 29: The Idea of the Democratic
Peace
Thursday
Dec. 1: Theories and Examples
·
Russett and Oneil, Triangulating Peace (entire).
Week Fourteen
**Short Paper due by 5:00 December 9 **
**Term Paper due by 5:00 December 12, if
applicable**