Foundationalism and Faith

W. K. Clifford gives an evidentialist objection to theism:

1) It's rational to believe p only if there is good evidence in favor of p.

2) There isn't good evidence in favor of God exists.

3) It's not rational to believe that God exists. (1)(2)

What exactly is "good evidence"?

Foundationalism

Some of the things I know, I believe on the basis of other things I know:

I believe that 'umbrageous' is spelled u-m-b-r-a-g-e-o-u-s because I believe that's how the dictionary spells it.

Some of the things I know, I don't believe on the basis of anything else I know:

7 + 5 = 12
I seem to have a slight pain in my hand

Call the latter beliefs basic.

According to foundationalism, my knowledge rests on a foundation of basic beliefs. If I know a proposition, then either it is properly basic or it is evident with respect to what is properly basic.

Not any old belief is properly basic.

Two traditional views:

Modern: A proposition is properly basic iff it's self-evident or incorrigible.
Ancient: A proposition is properly basic iff it's self-evident to the senses.

A proposition is self-evident if anyone who grasps it "sees" that it is true.

A proposition is incorrigible just in case you can't believe it and be mistaken.

A proposition is evident to the senses if it describes what is perceived.

The Argument Restated

1) It's rational to accept p only if either p is basic or p is evident with respect to what is basic.

2) God exists is not basic.

3) God exists is not evident with respect to what is basic.

4) It's not rational to accept the proposition that God exists. (1)(2)(3)

Criticism:

A. Why should we think that (2) is true?

B. But suppose that one of the modern or ancient definitions of 'properly basic' is correct. Then consider premiss (1).

See Alvin Plantinga, "Religious Belief without Evidence," in Pojman, pp. 414 ff.