The Problem of Evil

The Logical Problem of Evil

Mackie says that (1) (2) and (3) are contradictory:

(1) God is omnipotent

(2) God is wholly good

(3) There is evil.

Define

an explicit contradiction =df a conjunction of two propositions, one of which is the denial of the other

a set of propositions is explicitly contradictory =df one of its members is the denial of another of its members.
e.g., {Jones is a bachelor, It's false that Jones is a bachelor}

a set of propositions is formally contradictory =df an explicit contradiction is deducible by laws of logic from members of the set
e.g., {If Jones is a bachelor then Jones is unhappy, Jones is a bachelor, It's false that Jones is unhappy}

a set of propositions is implicitly contradictory =df there's a necessary truth which when added to the set yields a set that is formally contradictory
e.g., {Jones is a bachelor, It's false that Jones is unmarried} Add: All bachelors are unmarried.

Perhaps Mackie means that {(1), (2), (3)} is implicitly contradictory. He suggests these "quasi-logical rules":

(4) A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can.

(5) There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do.

Are (4) and (5) necessary (necessarily true)? Does adding them to {(1), (2), (3)} enable us to deduce a contradiction?

Re: (5) consider making a round square or making a married bachelor

(5')There are no non-logical limits to what an omnipotent being can do.

Re: (4) [trapped professor example]

(4a) A good thing eliminates every evil it knows about and can eliminate.

Re: (4a) [cutting off finger example]

(4b) A good thing eliminates every evil E that it knows about and can eliminate without bringing about a greater evil or eliminating a good state of affairs that outweighs E.

But [two friends in snowbank]

S properly eliminates an evil E =df S eliminates E without bringing about a greater evil or eliminating a good state of affairs that outweighs E

(4c) An omniscient and omnipotent good being eliminates every evil it can properly eliminate

Now add to the theistic set

(6) God is omniscient

The theistic set now is {(1), (2), (3) (6)}. Can we by adding (4c) and (5') to this set deduce a contradiction?

From (1), (2), (6), (4c), and (5') can we deduce not-(3)?

(If a set is formally contradictory, we can from any subset of all but one of its members, deduce the denial of the remaining member.)

(3*) There is no evil existing of the kind that God can properly eliminate.

So we haven't shown the theistic set to be contradictory.

Free Will Defense

Distinguish:

Defense: The attempt to show that God's existence is consistent with the existence of evil

Theodicy: The attempt to"explain the ways of God to man", that is, to say why there's evil

(Note: p and q are consistent iff it's possible that the conjunction of p and q is true)

A useful strategy:

To show that p and q are consistent, find a proposition r such that (i) it's possible that p and r are both true, and (ii) the conjunction of p and r entails q.

(Note: A entails B =df it's not possible that A is true and B is false.)

Example:

Note that for this strategy to succeed, r needn't be true or even remotely plausible. All that's required is that r is consistent with p and together with p entails q.

p = God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good.

q = There is evil.

Let's first consider what's involved in creating free agents.

According to Mackie God could have made beings who act freely but who always go right. Is this true? Consider

God can make S who freely and rightly does A

What would be required for this to be true? God couldn't make S and then cause S freely and rightly to do A, since God can't cause someone to do a particular action freely. So whether God can make S who freely and rightly chooses A depends in part on God and in part on what S chooses. Whether God can do it depends on which of these is true:

(i) if created by God, S will choose A

(ii) if created by God, S will choose not-A

God can create S and give S various properties and put S in a situation where S can choose A or not-A. But whether S chooses A or whether S chooses not-A depends on whether (i) is true or (ii) is true, and that's not up to God. (It's up to S.)

Now what's true for S is true for everyone. But what if everyone possible is such that if created by God to have free will, he or she will do at least one wrong action? Then God can't create a world containing free persons who always freely choose what's right.

Consider,

r = A world with free persons and a balance of good over evil is better than a world without free persons; and every possible free person would, if created, perform at least one wrong action; and God has created some free persons.

The conjunction of p and r is possible and entails q. So p and q are consistent.

Objection: This reply applies only to moral evil. What about physical evil? Even if God's existence is compatible with the existence of moral evil, isn't his existence incompatible with the existence of physical evil?

Reply: Define broadly moral evil to be evil that results from the free actions of agents, whether human or non-human. Then consider the possibility that natural evil is due to the free actions of Satan and his cohorts (see Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil). Now try

r' = A world with free persons and a balance of good over evil is better than a world without free persons; and every possible free person would, if created, perform at least one wrong action; and God has created some free persons, both human and non-human; all the evil in the world is broadly moral evil; and physical evil is broadly moral evil.